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Introduction
Capture Latch 
Assembly
 Part of the 
NDSB1
 Connects the 
docking
vehicles during 
Soft Capture.
 Releases 
during
Hard Capture
 Three latches 
per NDSB1
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Introduction
Capture Latches on first Flight NDSB1
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Design Overview
 Latch Pawl: Latching feature that 
reacts load from Passive Striker to 
attain capture between mating 
docking systems. 
 Passive latch striker plate: This 
is a simplified representation of the 
stationary latch interface hardware 
on the passive docking system.
 Motor: Provides the nominal 
actuation for the mechanism. 
 Internal Transmission/Linkage 
System: Transmits torque from 
the motor to the Latch Pawl and 
retains the pawl in desired 
position.
 Secondary Release Mechanism: 
Provides for secondary release in 
the event of a nominal drive 
system failure.
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Capture Latch Nominal Operations
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Docking
(Capture)
Undocking
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Capture Latch Nominal Operations
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Docking Simulation
Capture Latch Nominal Operations
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Undocking Simulation
Capture Latch Off-Nominal Operations
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Capture Latch Secondary Release
Capture Latch Off-Nominal Operations
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Capture Latch Secondary Release
Testing Summary
Test Campaign:
 Development
 Qualification
 Acceptance
Tests Included:
 Run-In
 Functional
 Random Vibration
 Thermal Vacuum & 
Thermal Cycling
 Primary Release
 Secondary
 Static Load
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Motor Failures
 Description of Failure: During the thermal 
cycling portion of acceptance testing, some 
motors failed to operate or exhibited 
erratic/intermittent behavior.
 Failure Investigation Summary:
 Troubleshooting and teardown was performed on 
the failed units.
 Ultimately the failure was found to be caused by 
cracks in the Hall Effect Device (HED) in the 
motor.
 The cracks were found to be caused by thermally 
induced stresses in the potting material, 
exacerbated by voids.
 Corrective Action
 Potting material was changed to a new material 
with a more compatible CTE
 Potting process changed to prevent void 
generation.
 All 12 flight motors successfully testing after 
redesign without issue.
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Secondary Release Mechanism Failures
 Description of Failure: During 
development and qualification testing, the 
secondary release mechanism failed to 
deploy.
 Failure Investigation Summary:
 Teardown and inspection of the 
mechanism revealed the presence of 
galling inside the Non-Explosive 
Actuator (NEA).
 Testing was performed which 
demonstrated that the galling was 
caused by the motion of the mechanism 
during vibration testing.
 Corrective Action:
 The mechanism supports were 
redesigned to eliminate motion during 
testing.
 After the redesign, the qualification 
testing was repeated successfully.
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Secondary Release Mechanism Failures
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Secondary Release Mechanism Failures
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Pre-Redesign Post-Redesign
Lessons Learned
Avoid Loosely Constrained Parts 
Pay Attention to Thermal Stresses In Potted Parts
Fully Address Failures During Development Testing
Watch the Test Whenever Possible
Use Caution with Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) Parts
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